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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE AND IMMUNITY
FOR CONGRESSIONAL AIDES-The United States Supreme Court has held
that the speech or debate clause applies to congressional aides, insofar
as the aides conduct would be a protected legislative act if performed
by the Member himself; but it does not extend immunity to the
Member's aide when testifying before a grand jury about acts done by
the Member or himself, if such inquiry does not impinge upon the
legislative process, and proves relevant to investigating possible third
party crimes.
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
A United States Senator read to a subcommittee from classified docu-
ments,' which he then placed in the public record.2 A grand jury,3
investigating whether violations of federal laws were implicated,4 sup-
poenaed an aide5 to the Senator. The Senator, as an intervenor, moved
to quash the subpoena, contending a violation of the speech or debate
clause would occur if the aide were compelled to testify.6
The district court denied' the motion, but issued a protective order8
1. The classified documents were a study by the Department of Defense entitled
"History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy," popularly called the
Pentagon Papers. See United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 931-32 (D. Mass. 1971).
2. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 609, vacating & remanding United States v.
Doe, 455 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1972).
At the conclusion of the meeting, Senator Gravel placed the entire study of forty-seven
volumes on file with the subcommittee, thereby making it widely available to the press.
332 F. Supp. at 933.
3. A federal grand jury had been conducting a valid investigation of the release and
publication of the Pentagon Papers when this case arose. 408 U.S. at 608, 626.
4. 408 U.S. at 608. The crime being investigated included the retention of public
property or records with intent to convert, 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970), the gathering and
transmitting of national defense information, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1970), the concealment or
removal of public records or documents, 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970), and conspiracy to commit
such offenses and to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
5. The aide, who had been added to the Senator's staff earlier in the day, was Dr.
Leonard S. Rodberg, a resident fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies. 408 U.S. at 608-09.
6. Id.
7. 332 F. Supp. at 938.
8. The protective order reads as follows:
(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating the release of the
Pentagon Papers may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's conduct at a
meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971,
nor about things done by the Senator in preparation for and intimately related to
said meeting.
(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own actions on June
677
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 11: 677, 1973
limiting the questioning of the aide.9 The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed ° the lower court's. decision, but modified the
protective order to prevent questioning about the Senator's efforts to
publish the Pentagon Papers." Although it agreed with the district
court that private publication of the documents was not constitution-
ally protected, the court of appeals held that questioning, concerning
such publication, of the congressional aide was barred because a com-
mon law privilege existed which is similar to the privilege that protects
executive officials from liability for libel' 2
The Supreme Court vacated 3 the judgment of the court of appeals,
and remanded 4 the cases to that court because the protective order,
issued by the court of appeals, unduly restricted the scope of the grand
jury inquiry.'3
29, 1971 after having been engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal staff to
the extent that they were taken at the Senator's direction either at a meeting of the
Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds or in preparation for and intimately
related to said meeting.
332 F. Supp. at 938.
9. The court reasoned that since the Senator could not be prosecuted for legislative
acts, the protective order would serve to limit the subject matter being investigated,
thereby insuring that no witness would be questioned about the Senator's conduct at the
subcommittee meeting, or about acts done by the Senator in preparation for or intimately
related to that meeting. 332 F. Supp. at 938. Similarly, the court restricted 'the questioning
of Dr. Rodberg by the grand jury because of the dependence by members of Congress on
their assistants. Id. at 937.
•10. United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 762 (1st Cir. 1972).
11. The protective order, modified by the court of appeals, reads as follows:
(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating the release of the
Pentagon Papers may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting
of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971; nor, if the
questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind the Senator's conduct at that
meeting, about any communications with him or with his aides regarding the
activities of the Senator or his aides during the period of their employment, in
preparation for and related to said meeting.
(2) Dr. Leonard Rodberg may not be questioned about his own actions in the
broadest sense, including observations and communications, oral or written, by or to
him or coming to his attention while being interviewed for, or after having been
engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the extent that they were
in the course of his employment.
408 U.S. at 612.
12. 455 F.2d at 760. The privilege was based upon Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959),
which gave absolute immunity to an executive officer for libel contained in a news release.
In the instant case, the court granted immunity. "[T]o the extent that a congressman has
responsibility to inform his constituents, his performance . . . may be protected from
liability by a common law privilege. ... Id. at 760. The court did not make a deter-
mination as to the possible extent of such an immunity for future cases; but it was certain
that the immunity applied to republication of the documents. Id. at 760-61.
It is not the intention of this casenote to discuss the republication aspects of the Gravel
case.
13. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 629 (1972).
14. Id. The Government's appeal and Senator Gravel's appeal were consolidated upon
grant of petitions for certiorari. 405 U.S. 916 (1972).
15. 408 U.S. at 627-28.
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Article I of the Constitution 16 supplies the background for the
Court's decision: ". . . for any speech or debate in either House ...
[senators and representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
place." 17 The speech or debate clause was modeled after the English
Bill of Rights, 8 and adopted by the Constitutional Convention without
debate or opposition.' 9 The judicial history of the clause before the
Supreme Court is limited,20 because, in part, the tradition of legislative
privilege is well established in our political system.2'
Despite this scant history, previous decisions by the Court have
established that "... the privilege has been recognized as an important
protection of the independence and integrity of the legislature .. ."22
which prevents ". . . prosecution by an unfriendly executive and con-
viction by a hostile judiciary.' '23 Its application is not limited to words
spoken in debate,24 but includes ".... things generally done in a session
of the House by one of its members in relation to business before it."25
The clause protects members of an investigating committee so long as
they act within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,26 and pre-
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
17. Id.
18. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 stated:
That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliment, ought not
to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliment.
United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966). For an extensive review of the historical
origins of the English Bill of Rights, and the speech or debate clause see Celia, The
Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past Present and
Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK L. Rha. 1 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Celia]; Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its Origin,
Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 960 (1951).
19. 383 U.S. at 177.
20. Previous to the October, 1971, term of the Supreme Court five cases had been
decided: Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 US. 82
(1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951); Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). Along with Gravel, another decision,
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), interpreted the speech or debate clause
during the 1971 term.21. 383 U.S. at 179. The Court in Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), noted
that, "[f]reedom of speech and action in the legislature was taken as a matter of course by
those who severed the Colonies from the Crown and founded our Nation . . ." and that,
... [t]he provision in the United States Constitution was a reflection of political prin-
ciples already firmly established in the States." Id. at 372-73.
22. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). Thomas Jefferson noted in a petition
addressed to the Virginia House of Delegates in 1797 that, "... their representatives, in
the discharge of their functions, should be free from the cognizance or coercion of the
coordinate branches, Judiciary and Executive." Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional
Speech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 960, 962 (1951).
23. 383 U.S. at 179.
24. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
25. Id. The Court noted that protected activity would include written reports by
congressional committee, resolutions, and voting. Id.
26. See Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). In Brandhove, the defendant alleged
that the committee summoned him to a hearing in which no legislative purpose was
679
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cludes a criminal prosecution which is based upon the substance of a
Member's speech delivered before Congress. 27
In light of this previous history, the Court addressed itself to the
-question whether legislative immunity should apply equally to a Mem-
ber and his aide. 28 Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority,29
agreed with the lower courts ". . . that for the purpose of construing
the privilege a Member and his aide are to be treated as one. ' '3 0 The
Court recognized that the interrelationship of the work of the congres-
sional aide with the modern legislative process was critical to a Mem-
ber's performance, 31 and that failure to treat the aide as a Member's
alter ego would frustrate and diminish the purpose of the speech or
debate clause. 32 At first glance, this conclusion would seem to conflict
contemplated; and that the hearing was designed to intimidate and silence him to prevent
him from exercising his constitutional rights. In deciding that the committee's actions
were valid, the Court stated:
The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not
for private indulgence but for the public good . . . .The holding of this Court in
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130, that it was not consonant with our scheme of
government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has remained
unquestioned.
Id. at 377.
27. 383 U.S. at 180. Johnson, a former congressman, was found guilty of conspiracy,
whereby he allegedly read a speech favorable to independent savings and loan associations
in the House to return for campaign contributions and legal fees. Id. at 171-72. The
Court, in response to the use of the speech by the Government, stated:
However reprehensible such conduct may be, we believe the Speech or Debate Clause
extends at least so far as to prevent it from being made the basis of a criminal charge
against a member of Congress of conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding
the due discharge of government functions. The essence of such a charge in this
context is that the Congressman's conduct was improperly motivated, and as will
appear that is precisely what the Speech or Debate Clause generally forcloses from
executive and judicial inquiry.
Id. at 180.
28. 408 U.S. at 616.
29. Justice White also drafted the opinion in Brazenburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), announced on the same day as Gravel, which held that grand juries may question
newsmen about their sources of information.
30. 408 U.S. at 616. In more precise language, the Court, quoting from United States
v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971), stated:
... the Speech of Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into things done by Dr. Rodberg
as the Senator's agent or assistant which would have been legislative acts, therefore
privileged, if performed by the Senator personally.
Id. at 937-38.
31. 408 U.S. at 616.
32. Id. at 616-17. The Court cited Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), in support of
its reasoning which seems to negate statements in previous cases which would have held
for an opposite result. See Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). "It should be noted
that this is a case in which the defendants are members of a legislature .... Legislative
privilege in such a case deserves greater respect .. " Id. at 378; accord, Dombrowski v.
Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (per curiam). "This Court has held . . . that this doctrine is less
absolute, although applicable, when applied to officers or employees of a legislative body,
rather than to legislators themselves." Id. at 85.
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with its prior rulings,u but the Court distinguished those situations as
being not worthy of speech or debate protection because there the
employees were engaged in illegal conduct.34
The Court then considered what type of conduct, by a Member or
his aide, would be protected. 35 Keeping in mind that the heart of the
clause is speech or debate,36 the Court noted that legislative acts are not
all-encompassing, 7 and that the privilege has not been extended be-
yond the legislative sphere.38 Therefore, in the words of the Court, for
an act, other than speech or debate, to fall within the protection of the
clause, the act:
[m]ust be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative
process by which Members participate in committee and House
proceedings ... or with respect to other matters which the Court
places within the jurisdiction of either House.39
In short, the privilege will be extended ". . . only when necessary to
prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations.- 40
The Court then used these guidelines in the determination of which
particular acts by the Senator and his aide would receive speech or
debate clause protection.41 It concluded that the clause would preclude
questioning of any witness, including the aide, relating to the conduct,
or the motives and purposes behind the conduct, of either the Senator
or the aide at the subcommittee meeting on June 29, 1971.42 Further-
more, any communications between the Senator and his aide which
related to the subcommittee meeting or any other legislative act by the
Senator would also be immune from grand jury inquiry.43
The Court specifically excluded from speech or debate clause pro-
tection any questioning of the Senator or his aide about acts performed
33. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 US. 486 (1969) (privilege did not apply to House
employees who tried to implement invalid resolution to exclude a representative-elect);
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (privilege did not apply to a committee
counsel who was charged with conspiring with state officials to carry out illegal search and
seizure); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) (privilege unavailable to Sergeant-at-
Arms who carried out House resolution authorizing defendant's arrest).
34. 408 U.S. at 620.
35. Id. at 624-25.
36. Id. at 625.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 624-25.
39. Id. at 625.
40. Id., quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1972).
41. 408 U.S. at 628-29.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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in preparation for the subcommittee hearing, if it proves relevant to
investigating possible third-party crimes.44 Therefore, not only the
aide, but also a congressman can be forced to testify before a grand
jury about his sources of information.45 Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting
in part,46 noted that "[t]his critical question was not embraced in the
petitions for certiorari .... Yet it is a question with profound implica-
tions for the effective functioning of the legislative process." 47 Never-
theless, the majority, did not ".... perceive any constitutional or other
privilege that shields ... any . . . witness from grand jury questions
relevant to tracing the source of obviously highly classified documents
.... as long as no legislative act is implicated by the questions. ' 4
In differing with the reasoning of the majority, Mr. Justice Stewart
cited the fact that "[i]n preparing for legislative hearings ... a member
of Congress obviously needs the broadest possible range of informa-
tion."49 He reasoned that in the future informants would be unwilling
to relate such information in the face of possible adverse consequences, 0
thereby inpairing the ability of congressmen to properly perform their
constitutional duty."1 He also agreed with the court of appeals that:
[t]o allow a grand jury to question a Senator about his sources
would chill both the vigor with which legislators seek facts, and
the willingness of potential sources to supply them. 2
44. Id. The Court, earlier in its discussion about immunity for congressional aides,
reasoned that:
The Speech or Debate Clause . . . provides no protection for criminal conduct
threatening the security of the person or property of others, whether performed at the
direction of the Senator in preparation for or in execution of a legislative act or done
without his knowledge or direction. Neither does it immunize Senator or aide from
testifying at trials or grand jury proceedings involving third-party crimes where the
questions do not require testimony about or impugn a legislative act.
Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
45. 408 U.S. 606, 629-30 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 630. The Government asked the Court to consider the following questions:
Whether Article 1, Section 6, of the Constitution providing that ". . . for any Speech or
Debate in either House," the Senator and Representatives "shall not be questioned
in any other Place" bars a grand jury from questioning aides of members of Congress
and other persons about matters that may touch on activities of a member of Congress
which are protected "Speech or Debate."
Whether an aide of a member of Congress has a common-law privilege not to testify
before a grand jury concerning private republication of material which his Senator-
employer had introduced into the record of a Senate subcommittee.
Id. at 631 n.l.
48. Id. at 628.
49. Id. at 630.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 630, quoting from United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 758-59 (1st Cir. 1972).
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His approach to the question of legislative immunity would involve a
balancing of the claims of the speech or debate clause against the claims
of the grand jury in the particularized context of the specific case. 53
Mr. Justice Brennan dissented separately 4 citing the fact that the
scope of the immunity was as important as the persons to whom it
extends. 55 He pointed out that "[t]he receipt of materials for use in a
congressional hearing is an integral part of the preparation for that
legislative act . .."56 which previously had been acknowledged by the
Court as an activity that must be shielded from scrutiny by the executive
and judiciary.5 7 Therefore, he reasoned that:
[i]t would accomplish little toward the goal of legislative freedom
to exempt an official act from intimidating scrutiny, if other con-
duct leading up to the act and intimately related to it could be
deterred by a similar threat. 58
The dissenting Justices allude to an apparent contradiction by the
Court which results from distinguishing source gathering from actual
legislative acts when determining the applicability of legislative im-
munity.59 The contradiction is the failure of the Court to apply legisla-
tive immunity to source gathering 0 in light of its previous statement
that the privilege extends to matters beyond pure speech or debate
when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such delibera-
tions." 61 If the majority intended to use "indirect impairment" 2 as a
standard by which the immunity would be applied, then source gather-
ing would have to be included within the purview of the clause; other-
53. Id. at 632. Mr. Justice Stewart took the view that it is not entirely clear that the
executive's interest in the administration of justice should always override the public
interest in having an informed Congress. Id. His primary reason for dissenting was that
the conclusion reached by the majority was summarily decided and resulted in an in-
flexible solution to the question of legislative immunity. Id. at 633.
54. 408 U.S. 606, 648 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr.
Justice Marshall joined in his dissenting opinion.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 662.
57. Id. Mr. Justice Brennan cited United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), for
authority. Although he did not refer to any specific passages in the Johnson opinion, sup-
port for his contention can be found in statements by the Johnson Court that intensive
judicial inquiry into the motives, manner of preparation and ingredients of the speech
given by the defendant violates the express language of the speech or debate clause and
the policies which underlie it. 383 U.S. at 175-77.
58. 408 U.S. at 663. Mr. Justice Brennan viewed source gathering as conduct which
should always be protected by the speech or debate clause.
59. See 408 U.S. at 628-29.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 625.
62. Id. The Court, quoting from United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753 (1st Cir, 1972),
seemed to indicate that this would be the method employed to determine availability of
legislative immunity for matters other than pure speech or debate. 408 U.S. at 625.
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wise, a legislator would be hampered by the constant threat of execu-
tive or judicial intervention.6 3
However, the Court's conclusion can be partially reconciled with
previous cases which held that certain conduct, such as implementation
of legislative acts64 and information gathering, 5 was unprotected ac-
tivity. 6 The majority reasoned that failure to grant the privilege in
these previous cases ". . . may have to some extent frustrated a planned
or completed legislative act, [but] .. .[n]o threat to legislative inde-
pendence was posed .... ,,67 The instant case differs from the previous
decisions because the Court, here, did not rely on any particular facts
for determining the availability of immunity.6 Consequently, it ap-
pears that under no circumstances will protection be afforded to the
source gathering process. 69
Contrasting. the history of the clause with the Court's conclusion
seems to indicate a departure from former interpretations70 to a nar-
rower construction.7' This change is accentuated when one considers
previous statements by the Court that ". . . the privilege will be read
broadly to effectuate its purpose,..." 7 2 and that ". .. the privilege was
... born primarily of a desire.., to prevent intimidation by the execu-
tive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary."73 Similarly,
in Kilbourn v. Thompson,74 the Court, while speaking about the con-
cept of legislative immunity,75 quoted with approval from Coffin v.
Coffin:76
63. See 408 U.S. at 660, 663.
64. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1881); see note 33 supra.
65. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); see note 33 supra.
66. 408 U.S. at 620.
67. Id. at 621.
68. See 408 U.S. at 622, 628.
69. Mr. Justice Stewart interpreted the Court's opinion as holding that the executive
may always compel a legislator to testify before a grand jury about his sources of in-
formation. Consequently, he dissented because this conclusion was too rigid. 408 U.S. at
633.
70. See Id. at 622. See also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). One com-
mentator has suggested that the speech or debate clause should encompass all the
representative functions which a modern congressman performs; and, although speech is
classically the basic element of the legislative process, it may be less significant than a
congressman's efforts to obtain or provide information to press for a change in policy.
Note, The Bribed Congressman's Immunity from Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 346
(1965).
71. 408 U.S. at 622.
72. 383 U.S. at 180.
73. Id. at 180-81.
74. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
75. Id. at 201-04.
76. 4 Mass. 9 (1808).
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These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of pro-
tecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to support the right of the People .... [T]he article ought not
to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may
be answered. 7
Examination of the majority opinion also reveals language in support
of a broader interpretation 7 which is consistent with the history of the
clause. Nevertheless, this interpretation is not reflected in the suggested
modification of the protective order by the Court.79
Although the Court recognized that the privilege of legislative im-
munity should extend to congressional aides, its failure to include the
information gathering process, by either the Member or his aides,
threatens the responsible functioning of Congress and emasculates the
purpose of the clause. Thus, a legislator now has to choose between
the possibility of executive or judicial intervention, or adjust his con-
duct to conform to the holding of the Court. Viewed from the effect on
all the members of Congress, rather than its justification in the instant
case, the Court has reached an unfavorable solution when compared
with other possible alternatives.8 0 Had the Court confined its conclu-
sion to the Senator's conduct,"' notice would have been served to other
congressmen that the speech or debate clause cannot be a complete
shield against judicial scrutiny, yet the essence of the clause would have
been preserved.
If one considers the case-by-case approach suggested by Mr. Justice
Stewart, 2 a more favorable solution could have been obtained. Such an
approach might not provide the best result over a short period of time;
nevertheless, the use of judicial discretion to evolve a proper construc-
tion of the scope of the privilege, would prove to be more than ade-
quate in the long run. A cautious approach combined with time and
77. 103 U.S. at 201-04; see Cella, supra note 18 (a thorough analysis of Coffin).
78. In its opinion the Court stated:
The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the govern-
ment wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or
threats from the Executive Branch.
408 U.S. at 616. Similarly, the Court stated:
Rather than giving the Clause a cramped construction, the Court has sought to
implement its fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive and
judicial oversight that realistically threaten to control his conduct as a legislator.
Id. at 618; see id. at 624.
79. Id. at 628-29.
80. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 189, 198-201 (1972).
81. The Court could have reached its conclusion in the same manner as it had done in
the previous cases.
82. 408 U.S. at 629.
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circumstances would yield a result which is consonant with the purpose
of the clause.83
Until this judicial status can be reached, the combination of a case-
by-case determination 4 and the power of the House to take action
against its members8 5 would act as a deterrent against abuse of the
privilege. In this way independence of the legislature is insured, and
the Members can effectively perform their constitutional duty.
Louis Leo Brunetti
FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C., SECTION 1343(3)-
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that for purposes of
federal jurisdiction arising under 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, and its juris-
dictional correlate 28 U.S.C., section 1343(3), there is no difference in
achieving the right to redress deprivation pursuant to section 1343(3),
whether the right asserted is personal, or proprietary.
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
Mrs. Lynch directed her employer to deposit ten dollars of her weekly
pay in a credit union savings account in 1968. Shortly thereafter, House-
hold Finance brought an action in a Connecticut state court, alleging
non-payment of a promissory note in the amount of five hundred twenty-
five dollars. Prior to Mrs. Lynch's being served with process, Household
Finance garnished the savings account set up by! her employer.1 Mrs.
Lynch then proceeded to file a class action in federal district court
against both the sheriffs who levied on the savings account, and House-
hold Finance which invoked the prejudgment garnishment procedure.2
In that action, the plaintiff alleged violation of due process and equal
83. See Cella, supra note 18.
84. Mr. Justice Stewart stated that this type of determination would balance the need
for an informed public with the proper administration of justice. 408 U.S. at 632.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
1. Household Finance Corp. garnished the savings account pursuant to CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 52-329 (1961), which authorizes summary prejudgment attachment, and gar-
nishment. Under the statute, this action could be taken at the request of attorneys for the
creditor.
2. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970). In this action,
a class action was used to represent those owners of savings and checking accounts who
sought declaratory and injunctive relief after having had their accounts garnished under
the Connecticut procedure.
686
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